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Abstract
We consider a neoclassical growth model with endogenous corruption. Corruption
and wealth, which are co-determined in equilibrium, are shown to be negatively cor-
related. Richer countries tend to be less corrupt, and corrupt economies tend to be
poorer. This observation gives rise to the following puzzle: If poorer countries do indeed
experience higher levels of corruption, and if indeed as suggested by a number of em-
pirical studies corruption hampers growth, then how did rich countries, who were poor
once, become rich? Our answer is simple. In the past, economies were mostly ￿closed￿
in the sense that it was diﬃcult to transfer illicit money outside of the economy. In
contrast, today￿s economies are mostly open. In the relatively closed economies of the
19th century, the gains from corruption remained inside the country and became part
of the economy￿s productive capital. In contrast, in today￿s open economies, corrupt
agents smuggle stolen money abroad depleting their country￿s stock of capital. We con-
￿rm this intuitive explanation by testing the hypothesis that the eﬀect of corruption
on wealth depends on the economy￿s degree of openness using cross-country data.
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11 Introduction
Until recently the prevailing view among historians and social scientists was that ￿corrup-
tion, like adolescence, is a phase which countries go through before they reach maturity￿
(Williams, 2000, p. ix) In ￿mature￿ countries, so it was held, social, political, and judicial
reforms combined to make corruption very rare. This rather optimistic view has now been
replaced with the view that, at least in today￿s developing economies, corruption is a serious
obstacle to development. The cure to corruption, so it is still believed, is in development,
but development may be stalled in a corrupt economy. Poor economies are thus caught in a
vicious cycle: high corruption leads to poverty, which generates yet more corruption, and so
on.1
This pessimism is diﬃcult to reconcile with the observation that many of today￿s devel-
oped economies experienced widespread corruption during their history. Theobald (1990),
for example, describes the widespread corruption of state legislatures and city governments
during the ￿gilded age￿ of 1860s and 1870s in the U.S. (see also Josephson, 1934, and Cal-
low, 1966). In England, corruption was so severe at times that Wraith and Simkins (1963),
for example, write ￿The settlements of 1660 and 1688 inaugurated the Age of Reason, and
substituted a system of patronage, bribery, and corruption for the previous method of blood-
letting￿ (p. 60). Indeed, Bardhan (1997, p. 1328) notes that ￿Historians [...] point to many
cases when a great deal of corruption in dispensing licenses, or loans, or mine and land
concessions has been associated with (and may have even helped in) the emergence of an
entrepreneurial class.￿ What is it then that makes present corruption so much more harm-
ful to development than past corruption? Why is corruption said to stall development in
many of today￿s developing economies, but not in the developing economies of one or more
centuries ago?
We present a simple theory that provides an explanation for this puzzle and is consistent
with a number of other stylized facts about the relationship between corruption and growth.
We consider a neoclassical growth model with endogenous corruption. Corruption is modeled
1Bardhan (1997) for example writes ￿it is probably correct to say that the process of economic growth
ultimately generates enough forces to reduce corruption￿ (p. 1329). But, as Williams (2000) cautions,
because ￿the ￿take oﬀ￿ phase of economic growth seen as necessary for [...] development had not materialized.
[...] It is no longer legitimate to assume that development would resolve the multiple problems besetting the
South (p. ix)
1as follows. State oﬃcials may steal part of tax revenues which the government is using to
￿nance the provision of a public good. An oﬃcial that is caught stealing loses his job and
with it his income, which is higher in richer countries. Consequently, in richer countries
oﬃcials are less inclined to steal and corruption is lower. The government anticipates the
level of corruption and in every period sets the tax rate to maximize the discounted present
value of output. For a large set of parameter values, at least two stable steady-state equilibria
are shown to exist, one with a high level of wealth and a low level of corruption, and another
with a low level of wealth and a high level of corruption. Wealth and corruption are thus
co-determined in equilibrium. Furthermore, the long run behavior of the economy depends
on its initial conditions. Wealthy economies grow and converge to a steady-state with a
high level of capital and a low level of corruption, while poor economies are trapped in a
vicious circle in which high levels of corruption lead to low output, which generates yet more
corruption, and so on.
This relationship between wealth and corruption is consistent with the documented nega-
tive relationship between countries￿ wealth and levels of corruption (see, e.g., Hall and Jones,
1999, Kaufmann et al., 1999, and LaPorta et al., 1999).2 Surprisingly, although a lot of at-
tention has been devoted to the eﬀect of corruption on wealth and growth,3 and to the causes
for corruption,4 l e s sh a sb e e nw r i t t e no nt h ee ﬀect of wealth and growth on corruption.5
As mentioned above, the negative relationship between corruption and wealth gives rise to
the following puzzle: If poorer countries do indeed experience higher levels of corruption, and
if indeed as suggested by a number of empirical studies (Mauro, 1995, and others), corruption
hampers growth, then how did rich countries, who were poor once, become rich? Our answer
2Of related interest is Paolo Mauro￿s (1995) study which ￿nds a signi￿cant negative correlation between
corruption and the investment rate or the rate of growth. See also Tanzi (1998) and Mo (2001).
3See, e.g., Ehrlich and Lui (1999), Barreto (2000), Sarte (2001), Tanzi (1998), and Ventelou (2002).
4See, e.g., Easterly and Levine (1997), La Porta et al. (1999), and Treisman (2000). Factors that have
been found to contribute to corruption include ethnic fragmentation, proximity to the equator, the use of
French or socialist laws, and a large number of Catholic or Muslim citizens. Countries with Protestant
traditions, histories of British rule, and higher imports, were found to be less corrupt.
5La Porta et al. (1999) ￿nd that poor countries tend to be more corrupt, and Treisman (2000) reports
a negative relationship between economic development and corruption. Bardhan (1997) observes that ￿Al-
though the requisite time series evidence in terms of hard data is absent, circumstantial evidence suggests
that over the last 100 years or so corruption has generally declined with economic growth in most rich
countries￿ (p. 1329).
2is very simple. Corruption is disruptive for two main reasons. First, corruption causes
ineﬃcient distortion of market activities. Second, resources that were obtained through
corrupt activities are diverted outside of the economy, which depletes the economy￿s stock
of capital. We argue that the latter eﬀect is perhaps even more important than the former.
In the past, economies were mostly ￿closed￿ in the sense that it was diﬃcult to transfer
illicit money outside of the economy. In contrast, today￿s economies are mostly open. In the
relatively closed economies of the 19th century, the gains from corruption remained inside the
country and became part of its productive capital. In contrast, in today￿s open economies,
corrupt agents, who fear they may be caught and required to return the stolen money,
smuggle it abroad depleting their country￿s stock of capital. Countries that are rich today
were poor and corrupt once, but at a time where most of the world was composed of closed
economies. Now, of course, the situation is very diﬀerent. This insight can also help explain
the otherwise puzzling ￿ow of capital from poor to rich countries, which con￿icts with the
predictions of conventional neoclassical growth theories according to which capital should
￿ow from rich economies where the return to capital is relatively low to poor economies
where the return to capital is relatively high (see, e.g., Lucas 1990).
We test the hypothesis that the eﬀect of corruption on wealth depends on the economy￿s
degree of openness using cross-country data. To proxy for openness, we use the newly
collected classi￿cation of countries compiled by Wacziarg and Welch (2002). Like the widely
used Sachs-Warner (1995) index, Wacziarg and Welch classify countries as open or closed
based on the black market premium, the level of tariﬀs, whether the country is socialist,
and the presence of non-tariﬀ barriers to trade or of an export marketing board. All these
measures re￿ect to some extent the ease with which stolen money can be smuggled outside
the country. We ￿nd strong empirical support for our principal claim. Our results indicate
that in open economies there is a strong adverse eﬀect of corruption on output, whereas
in closed economies we do not ￿nd any evidence that corruption is harmful at all. These
results are robust to various de￿nitions of openness and subsamples, and persist even if one
takes into account the possible endogeneity of the corruption variable and estimates the
relationship via Instrumental Variables.
Another relevant observation is the recent critique of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) of
the empirical literature that documents a positive relation between openness and growth.
Rodriguez and Rodrik argue that in spite of the almost universal consensus about the bene￿ts
3of openness, careful econometric analysis does not indicate any positive relation between
openness and growth. The results reported here, namely that openness may aggravate the
adverse eﬀects of corruption and therefore hamper growth is consistent with their ￿nding.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we present the model.
The model￿s predictions are described in Section 3. In Section 4 we describe our empirical
methodology and data. The empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 oﬀers
concluding comments.
2T h e M o d e l




1−α 0 < α < 1( 1 )
where At is a factor of productivity and Kt is capital at t,a n dL is labor.
Denote the total amount of (pre-tax) capital resources in the economy in period t by Qt.
The government taxes these resources and uses the proceeds to produce the common factor of
productivity, At. However, corrupt bureaucrats steal part of the tax revenues which implies
t h a tl e s sc a nb eu s e dt op a yf o rt h ep r o d u c t i o no fAt.
Letting τt denote the tax rate, ct the total amount of resources stolen by bureaucrats,
and φ the proportion of stolen resources that are reinvested in the economy in period t, At
and Kt are given by the following equations,
At =( τtQt − ct)
β β > 0. (2)
Kt =( 1 − τt)Qt + φct 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. (3)
Namely, in every period the government uses the collected taxes less the amount stolen,
τtQt−ct, to produce the common factor of productivity At; and the amount of the productive
capital in the economy, Kt, is equal to the amount of after-tax resources, (1 − τt)Qt, plus
the amount of stolen resources that are reinvested in the economy, φct.W ea s s u m et h a tt h e
rest of the stolen resources, (1 − φ)ct, are smuggled outside of the economy.
What determines the fraction of stolen resources that are reinvested in the economy, φ?
We assume that φ is negatively related to the economy￿s degree of openness. Our assumption
is motivated by the following consideration. For a corrupt oﬃcial, the advantage of smuggling
4stolen resources outside the country is that in case he is caught, the authorities would
not be able to retrieve the stolen money, whereas he may yet regain access to it after he
completes his prison term. Smuggling stolen resources outside the country may also make
their consumption less conspicuous, and therefore reduce the likelihood of getting caught.
On the other hand, conventional wisdom suggests that investors strongly favor investment in
their own country, where they have better information on investment opportunities (French
and Poterba, 1991). In a more open country, the cost of smuggling stolen resources outside
the economy is lower, and the net return on overseas investment is higher. We therefore
expect that in open economies more stolen resources will be smuggled outside the economy
than in closed economies; it follows that the proportion of stolen resources that are reinvested
in the economy would tend to be higher in closed economies.6
To ensure that total return to capital in both the private and public sectors is decreasing,
we require that the two parameters α and β be such that
α + β < 1.
Every period, a measure one of bureaucrats or state oﬃcials each choose an amount ct
of resources to steal that would maximize their expected utilities:
(1 − π (ct))u(wt + ct)( 4 )
subject to the constraint
ct ≤ τtQt. (5)
The function u(•) denotes the state oﬃcials￿ utility function; π (ct) denotes the probability
of getting caught as a function of the amount of resources stolen, ct;a n dwt denotes state
oﬃcials￿ wage rate. The utility function u(•) is assumed to be non negative, increasing, and
concave. State oﬃcials￿ utility when they are caught is normalized to zero. The probability
of getting caught π(•) is assumed to be increasing, diﬀerentiable, and convex on the interval
[0,c]f o rs o m ec<∞, to be equal to one for all c ≥ c, to be equal to zero at zero, and
to have a derivative of zero at zero. We assume that oﬃcials can only steal from the taxes
they themselves have collected, which implies that ct ≤ τtQt. B e c a u s ea l ls t a t eo ﬃcials are
identical, they each steal the same amount ct. The fact that there is a measure one of state
6Indeed, Pastor (1990) ￿nds that exchange controls reduce the extent of capital ￿ight.
5oﬃcials implies that ct is also the total amount of resources stolen in the economy, and that
each state oﬃcial is responsible for the collection of τtQt of tax revenues at t. For simplicity,
we assume that the oﬃcials￿ wage rate in every period is proportional to the amount of
resources in the economy in that period, or that wt = γQt for some ￿xed γ > 0f o re v e r y
t ≥ 1. We refer to the amount stolen in period t, ct, as the level of corruption in the economy
in period t.
In every period the government, who anticipates the amount stolen by its oﬃcials, sets
the tax rate τt to maximize the discounted value of future output.
Finally, the total amount of resources in the economy in period t +1i se q u a lt ot h e
amount of savings in period t. For simplicity we adopt the standard assumption that savings
is a ￿xed proportion s ∈ (0,1) of the total output, or that,
Qt+1 = sYt. (6)
3A n a l y s i s
De￿nition. As e q u e n c e{(Yt,Q t,A t,τt,c t)}t≥1 is a competitive equilibrium of the economy
if it satis￿es equations (1)-(3), (6), and is such that for every t ≥ 1, ct is chosen optimally by
state oﬃcials given Qt and τt, and τt is chosen optimally by the government given Qt and
ct.
3 . 1 A n a l y s i so fP e r i o dt
For every level of Qt and τt, denote the state oﬃcials￿ optimal choice of corruption by
c(Qt,τt). As shown by Lemma 1 below, the amount of resources stolen in every period,
decreases as the economy becomes richer.7
Lemma 1. There exists a level of resources Q > 0 such that in every period t ≥ 1, for
Qt ≤ Q, state oﬃcials￿ optimal choice of corruption is given by c(Qt,τt)=τtQt for every
τt ∈ [0,1]. For Qt >Q ,c(Qt,τt) declines continuously in Qt and is independent of the tax
rate τt except in case where it is so small that state oﬃcials would want to set ct > τtQt
7This is consistent with the empirical ￿ndings of Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001)w h os h o wt h a t
corruption is decreasing in the wage paid to state employees (which, in our model, is assumed to be increasing
in Qt).
6if they could. In this case, because ct is constrained to be smaller than or equal to τtQt,
c(Qt,τt)=τtQt.
The reason that corruption declines with output is very simple. Higher wages reduce
the marginal utility from corruption, and therefore, higher wages reduce the incentive of
government bureaucrats to steal. Hence, our assumption that state oﬃcials￿ wages are pro-
portional to output implies that bureaucratic corruption is lower in richer countries. In very
poor economies, that is when Q ≤ Q, the marginal utility from corruption is so high and
tax revenues are so low that all tax revenues are stolen.
As mentioned above, in every period, the government, who anticipates the level of cor-
ruption, determines the tax rate τt so as to maximize the discounted present value of output.
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, if Qt >Qand the government expects the level of corruption











if Qt ≤ Q, then the government is indiﬀerent among all tax rates τt ∈ [0,1].
Lemma 2 implies that greater corruption leads to higher tax rates. This is because the
government anticipates the loss of revenues caused by corruption and reacts to it by raising
the tax rate. However, if the economy is so poor that all the tax revenues will anyway be
stolen, then the tax rate becomes immaterial.
Three remarks are in order. First, if Qt >Q , then the government sets the tax rate τt
in such a way that ct < τtQt.
Second, by construction, taxes in our model are not distortionary. If they were, as they
usually are in practice, then corruption would have caused an additional harm by inducing
higher tax rates.
Third, whenever, Qt >Q , corruption aﬀects output only through its eﬀect on the level
of capital ￿ight. In the extreme case in which the economy is completely closed and φ =1 ,
the level of corruption has no eﬀect on equilibrium at all. To see this, suppose that if there
was no corruption (c = 0), then the government would have set the tax rate optimally at
τ∗ =
β
α+β, with the resulting levels of A∗ =( τ∗Q)
β and K∗ =( 1−τ∗)Q. If φ =1 , then given
any corruption level c, setting τ = τ∗ + c/Q generates the same values of A∗ and K∗, as in
the economy without corruption.
73.2 The Dynamics
In equilibrium, the state of the economy at date t is completely determined by the value of
Qt. In order to study the dynamics of the economy, it is convenient to express Qt+1 in terms
of Qt. Equations (1)-(3), (6) imply that Qt+1 = fφ (Qt)w h e r efφ (•)i sg i v e nb y :
fφ (Qt)=s(τtQt − ct)
β ((1 − τt)Qt + φct)
αL
1−α (8)
where ct = c(Qt,τt)a n dτt is given by (7). The following lemma describes the properties of
fφ (Qt).
Lemma 3. The function fφ(•) has the following properties:
1. fφ (•) is continuous;









3. fφ (Q) tends to in￿nity with Q;
4. The derivative of fφ (Q) t e n d st oz e r oa sQ tends to in￿nity.
The properties of fφ(•) imply that, generically, there are two possibilities. Either the
entire graph of fφ lies below the 450 line, in which case there is a unique steady-state
equilibrium at Q =0 ;o rfφ crosses the 450 line at least twice in which case there are at
least two stable steady-states, one at zero and the other at some Q∗ > 0. In the latter case,
the equilibrium to which the economy converges depends on the initial value Q1. Note that
fφ (•) increases as the probability of getting caught, π, increases. In the extreme case where
π(0) = 1, there is no corruption and our model becomes very similar to the standard Solow
model. Note also that fφ (•)i si n c r e a s i n gi nφ. This is due to the fact that, for simplicity,
we focus our attention only on the negative eﬀects of openness (namely, the facilitation of
capital ￿ight) while ignoring its bene￿ts.
4 Methodology and Data
4.1 Methodology
The theoretical model described in the previous sections generates an easily testable empirical
implication. Output per worker should be negatively related to corruption in open economies,
8while there should be no such relationship in closed economies. Assume that we have a
continuous measure of corruption and a binary indicator of openness, that takes on the
value of 1 for open countries, and zero for closed countries. Then, one could run regressions
of log GDP per capita on the corruption index, separately for open and closed countries,
and test whether the coeﬃcient on the corruption variable is signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero,
and whether it is signi￿cantly more negative in the open country sample. A more eﬃcient
way of testing the theory is by pooling all countries together, and estimating the following
regression:
lnGDPi = β0 + β1CORRUPTIONi + β2OPENi + β3CORRUPTIONi ￿ OPENi + γ
0Xi + εi,
(9)
where GDPi is GDP per capita in country i, Xi is a vector of other observed determinants of
output, and εi is an error term capturing measurement error and unobserved determinants
of output. This regression implies that for closed countries, the relationship between output
per capita and corruption is
lnGDPi = β0 + β1CORRUPTIONi + γ
0Xi + εi,
whereas for open countries the relationship is
lnGDPi =( β0 + β2)+( β1 + β3)CORRUPTIONi + γ
0Xi + εi.
Therefore, according to our model, β1 should be indistinguishable from zero, while (β1+β3)
should be negative and signi￿cant.
Several points in our econometric speci￿cation deserve special comment. First of all, we
focus on levels of income per capita rather than growth rates. This is in accordance with
the theoretical model, and also follows recent work by Hall and Jones (1999) and Kaufmann
et al. (1999). One can justify this approach by noting that levels, and not growth rates,
capture fundamental cross-country diﬀerences in consumption, and hence in welfare levels.
In addition, the theoretical literature on growth predicts that in the long run all countries
should grow at the same rate, so that cross-country diﬀerences in growth are by their nature
transitory (Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). This prediction
is con￿rmed by the ￿nding in Easterly et al. (1993), who ￿nd that growth rates are weakly
correlated across decades.
9Second, the issue arises as to whether one should include other determinants of output
on the right hand side of equation (9). On the one hand, if one views the equation as a
true long run relationship, it makes little sense to control for variables (such as stocks of
physical and human capital, the size of government, the rate of in￿ation, etc.) that are
themselves the endogenous outcomes of the process of economic development. This is the
approach taken by Hall and Jones (1999), who did not include any additional variables to
their speci￿cation other than in their ￿nal table. On the other hand, it may be hard to
believe that corruption and openness are the sole determinants of economic outcomes, and
one may be interested in whether the relationship postulated in the theoretical section holds
up or within a given subset of countries classi￿ed by geography or by their initial stocks of
capital. Therefore, we present results both with and without additional control variables:
in any case, the models with control variables are extremely parsimonious, and include only
continent dummies and the stock of human capital measured by the total years of schooling
attained by the population aged 25 and over.
We must also address the potential endogeneity of corruption and economic development.
In the model, corruption and output are jointly determined, so that one cannot assign a
causal interpretation to the OLS estimates of equation (9). Moreover, since corruption
is only imperfectly measured, the OLS estimates suﬀer from attenuation bias as well as
simultaneity bias. Both biases can be addressed if we have exogenous instruments that are
correlated with corruption but uncorrelated with the error term in equation (9). The existing
literature has suggested at least three diﬀerent sets of instruments for corruption.
Mauro (1995) and Alesina et al. (2003) argue that societies that are more ethnically or
linguistically fractionalized have more corrupt governments, as bureaucrats may have larger
incentives to steal money to favor members of their own group. Since the degree of ethnic
and linguistic fractionalization is to a large extent determined by the arbitrary straight-line
borders traced by colonial powers in the past, it seems reasonable to assume that this variable
is uncorrelated with the disturbance in today￿s output equation.
Hall and Jones (1999) and Kaufmann et al. (1999) instrument social infrastructure using
the fraction of the population who speaks English and other major European languages as
their mother tongue. The underlying idea for these instruments is that countries where
the extent of Western European in￿uence was greater were more likely to adopt a social
and economic infrastructure that was favorable for economic development: protection of
10property rights, a system of checks and balances in government, the free-market ideas of
Adam Smith. Moreover, factors that attracted Western European colonizers ￿ve centuries
ago (an abundance of natural resources, sparse population) seem unlikely to be correlated
with unobserved determinants of productivity today.
Finally, LaPorta et al. (1999) show that the quality of government is strongly related to
a country￿s legal origins: countries with a French or socialist legal system tend to have lower
quality government, relative to countries with an English common law, and hence, more
corruption, less protection of property rights, a higher regulatory burden, and less eﬃcient
provision of essential public goods. LaPorta et al. argue that English common law, which
developed as a reaction of Parliament and property owners to attempts by the sovereign to
expropriate them, is more conducive to good governance; on the other hand, French civil
law, which developed as an instrument to build the state and expand the sovereign￿s power,
will by its nature restrict individuals￿ property rights; socialist law is an extreme case of
the State creating institutions that protract the Communist party￿s hold on power, without
much respect for individual￿s rights and freedoms. Once again, in using the legal origin
dummies as instruments, we assume that the only eﬀect of legal origins on present output is
through their eﬀect on the quality of government.
We therefore use these three sets of instruments to obtain IV estimates for the parameters
of equation (9). Since the endogenous variable, corruption, enters both linearly and inter-
acted with the openness variable, the instruments will also be interacted. We now proceed
to the description of our variables.
4.2 Data
Our goal in collecting the data is to create as large a sample as possible that includes
information on GDP per capita, the level of corruption, and openness. Therefore, we collect
data from several sources. The variables and their sources are summarized in Table 1.
Our main measure of economic development is the 1995-1999 average of GDP per capita
in current U.S. dollars evaluated at purchasing power parity, and is taken from the 2001
World Bank Development Index CD-Rom. Altogether, GDP per capita is available for 165
countries and dependencies.
As our measure of corruption we use the newly created data set of Kaufmann, Kraay
and Zoido-Lobat· on (1999, henceforth KKZ). KKZ use a variety of indicators collected by
11international organizations, political and business rating agencies, think tanks and non-
governmental organizations to construct six broad aggregates that measure governance in
the 1990s. One of these aggregates , which KKZ refer to as ￿graft￿, measures perceptions
of corruption. Corruption can be easily de￿ned using the conventional de￿nition: the exer-
cise of public power for private gain. The various sources used by KKZ examine somewhat
diﬀerent aspects of corruption, ranging from ￿corruption of public oﬃcials,￿ ￿eﬀectiveness
of anticorruption initiatives,￿ ￿corruption as an obstacle to business,￿ ￿frequency of ￿addi-
tional payments￿ to ￿get things done,￿ ￿ ￿mentality regarding corruption,￿ and the ￿eﬀect of
corruption on the attractiveness of a country as a place to do business.￿ The KKZ index
is standardized so as to have mean zero and standard deviation of one in the sample. High
values of the index represent good governance, that is, low corruption. We multiply the
index by -1 so that, consistent with our terminology throughout the paper, countries with a
high value of the CORRUPTION variable are indeed more corrupt. Overall, the corruption
index is available for 155 countries.
We classify countries based on their openness status in the 1990s using the newly created
data set of Wacziarg and Welch (2002, henceforth WW). WW extend the Sachs-Warner index
of openness to the 1990s, and also expand the list of countries for which the index is available
to include the economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states
of the former Soviet Union. Countries are classi￿ed as open if they satisfy all the following
￿ve criteria: (1) the average of unweighted tariﬀs in the 1990-1999 period is lower than
40%; (2) the average of core non-tariﬀ barriers on capital goods and intermediates is lower
than 40%; (3) the average black market premium over the period is lower than 20%; (4)
the country does not have an export marketing board; and (5) the country is not socialist.
Note that some of the openness criteria capture the extent to which the country is open with
respect to trade of physical goods, while others, such as the black market premium, have
more to do with the degree of openness of ￿nancial markets. In our theoretical model, the
openness variable, φ, re￿ects the ease with which corrupt bureaucrats are able to transfer
stolen funds abroad, and is therefore related primarily to the openness of ￿nancial markets.
Therefore, one could argue that the black market premium alone captures more accurately
our theoretical concept. In our basic regressions we will use the conventional de￿nition of
openness that aggregates all ￿ve criteria, but we will present separate results using only the
black market premium as the basis for our openness dummy. Altogether, openness status is
12available for 141 countries.
We collect data on countries￿ legal origins from LaPorta et al. (1999), and use the data
set in Alesina et al. (2003) to construct the other instruments: percentage English and
European language speakers, as well as ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. Data on
educational attainment of the population aged 25 and over is taken from Barro and Lee￿s
(1996) data set.
We end up with a sample of 133 countries for which data is available on GDP per capita,
corruption and openness. The list of countries, classi￿ed by their openness status and their
degree of corruption is presented in Table 2. As can be seen, all closed countries with the
exception of Estonia are characterized by at least a medium degree of corruption. On the
other hand, open economies exhibit a wide range of corruption levels. Most OECD countries
are open and are characterized by low corruption. Interestingly, corruption does not seem
to be con￿ned to any particular geographic region. Countries with low levels of corruption
can be found in Sub-Saharan Africa (Botswana), Central America (Costa Rica, Trinidad and
Tobago), East Asia (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan) and among the transition
economies of Central and Eastern Europe (Slovenia, Hungary). At the same time, these
regions also have worthy representatives among the list of highly corrupt countries.
Summary statistics for all of our variables are presented in Table 3.
5R e s u l t s
The main point of the paper is best illustrated by Figure 1 below.
In the top panel (Figure 1a) we present a scatter plot of log GDP per capita in the
1995-1999 period on our index of corruption among countries that were classi￿ed as open in
the 1990s according to Wacziarg and Welch (2002). There is clearly a very strong negative
relationship between economic development and corruption among open economies: the
simple regression coeﬃcient is −0.95, its associated t-statistic is −14.93, and corruption
alone explains more than 70 percent of the variance in log income. On the other hand,
there is essentially no correlation at all between corruption and GDP per capita in closed
economies (Figure 1b): the regression coeﬃcient is statistically indistinguishable from zero,
and corruption explains less than one percent of the variance in log income. The graphical
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Figure 1b: Corruption and Economic Development ￿ Closed Countries
14in fact, had we expanded the scale of the horizontal axis among closed economies to the
whole range of corruption values present in open countries, the line would have looked even
more ￿at. Moreover, the very strong relationship between corruption and GDP among open
countries does not depend simply on the inclusion of the rich, non-corrupt countries clustered
in the top left-hand corner of the graph. If we had restricted the sample to countries with a
higher degree of corruption than Estonia (the least corrupt of the closed countries), we still
would have obtained a coeﬃcient of −0.99, a t-statistic of −5.7 0 ,a n da nR - s q u a r eo f0 .35.
Overall, the graphical evidence is strongly supportive of our theory. We now proceed to test
whether the simple relationships uncovered in the graphs are robust to a variety of diﬀerent
speci￿cations and estimation techniques.
In Table 4 we present simple OLS estimates of equation (9). Column (1) of the table
essentially replicates the regressions presented in Figure 1, but pools all countries together
and adjusts standard errors by allowing for potential heteroskedasticity. The coeﬃcient on
corruption is small and indistinguishable from zero, whereas the coeﬃcient on the interaction
is negative and highly signi￿cant. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of no relationship
between corruption and GDP among closed countries, but we strongly reject it among open
countries. The size of the eﬀect is also economically signi￿cant: if we attach to the coeﬃcients
a causal interpretation, an open economy with an average degree of corruption like Slovakia
(corruption index = −0.03) could see its GDP per capita rise by 158 percent if it could
achieve the same quality of government as that of Slovenia (corruption index = −1.02).
Column(2) of the table controls for regional diﬀerences in income per capita by including
a set of continent dummies. The results are virtually unchanged: the eﬀect of corruption
on GDP is now basically zero in closed economies, while a one standard deviation increase
in corruption lowers per capita income by 80 log points if the country is open. Column (3)
controls for continent dummies and education in 1990. The sample shrinks to 95 countries,
as the Barro-Lee data set does not have information on the newly independent states of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, but the results are virtually unchanged: a one
standard deviation in corruption lowers GDP per capita by about 49 log points, even for
countries that are otherwise identical in terms of their geographic location and their stock
of human capital. Finally, Columns (4) and (5) report the results of separate regressions
for the sample of closed and open countries with the inclusion of continent dummies and
years of education. We ￿nd that in open economies, the coeﬃcient on corruption drops to
15−0.45, but it is still highly statistically signi￿cant. In closed economies, the coeﬃcient on
corruption has the wrong sign, and is indistinguishable from zero.
In Table 5 we try several alternative speci￿cations to test the robustness of the results.
One possible concern with our classi￿cation of openness is that the Wacziarg-Welch measure
is based on the average of the 1990s of its component variables. The 1990s saw a large
number of developing countries move towards trade liberalization. If at the beginning of
the period mostly rich and non-corrupt countries were open to trade, and during the 1990s
poor countries with corrupt governments also liberalized, we would tend to ￿nd a negative
relationship between GDP and corruption among open countries that has nothing to do with
our theory on the joint determination of corruption and output. Therefore, in the ￿rst column
we classify countries based on whether they were ever open based on the Sachs-Warner
criteria between 1990 and 1992. As in Table 4, we ￿nd that the coeﬃcient on corruption
is essentially zero, while the coeﬃcient on the interaction is negative and signi￿cant. In
Column (2), we restrict the de￿nition of openness to countries that had an average black
market premium below 20 percent. This de￿nition, which focuses on the degree of ￿nancial
openness, re￿ects more closely the theoretical construct described in the model: the resulting
coeﬃcients are virtually unchanged relative to Table 4. In Column (3) we use data on
corruption and openness from the 1970s and 1980s. Speci￿cally, the corruption variable is
taken from Mauro (1995), and as our openness variable we take the average between 1975
and 1984 of the Sachs-Warner dummies. The coeﬃc i e n to nc o r r u p t i o ni si n s i g n i ￿cant, while
the coeﬃcient on the interaction has a t-statistic of 1.58. However, the hypothesis that the
sum of the coeﬃcients is equal to zero is soundly rejected: even in the 1980s, there existed
as i g n i ￿cant negative relationship between corruption and output, but only among open
countries.
The next three columns of the Table restrict the sample along several dimensions. The
exclusion of high income countries in column (4) has essentially no eﬀect, neither qualita-
tively nor quantitatively, on our coeﬃcients. In columns (5) and (6) we estimate the equation
for African and Asian countries alone, and we still ￿nd either a zero or a positive relation-
ship between corruption and output among closed economies, and a strong and signi￿cant
negative relationship among open economies.
In Table 6 we address the issue of the potential endogeneity of the corruption variable.
The ￿rst three columns of the Table present IV estimates of equation (9) where we control for
16regional diﬀerences in GDP by including continent dummies. The instrument set is made up
of legal origin dummies (column 1), the percentage in the population that speaks English and
the percentage that speaks a major European language (column 2), and the degree of ethnic
and linguistic fractionalization (column 3); in addition, the interaction of these variables with
the openness dummy is also included in the instrument set. There is substantial variability
in the coeﬃcients on the corruption and the corruption-openness interaction, but this is
probably due to the weak power of the instruments in the closed countries sample, which
leads to highly imprecise estimates. In fact, in contrast to the wide range of estimates in the
individual coeﬃcients, the implied eﬀect of corruption on log GDP in open economies (i.e.,
the sum of the two coeﬃcients) ranges from −0.806 to −1.157, a result very much in line with
the OLS estimates of Table 4. In all three cases, the F test for the hypothesis that the sum
of the coeﬃcients is equal to zero is soundly rejected. The ￿rst stage F statistic is large in
the ￿rst two speci￿cations, whereas in column (3) it exceeds conventional signi￿cance values
but is somewhat smaller than the ￿rule of thumb￿ value of 10, casting some doubts on the
validity of the estimates. In all cases, we do not reject the over-identi￿cation test for the
validity of the instruments. In column (4) we add log years of schooling to the list of control
variables, and use the legal origin dummies as instruments.8 The results are similar to those
obtained using OLS: a one standard deviation in corruption lowers GDP per capita by 53 log
points, holding constant the stock of human capital and geographic characteristics. Finally,
columns (5) and (6) estimate separate IV regressions for open and closed countries, using
the legal origin dummies as instruments. The coeﬃcient on corruption for open countries is
−0.39, signi￿cant at the 5.3 percent level, while the coeﬃcient for closed countries is large,
positive and marginally insigni￿cant. However, this result is questionable given the very low
value of the ￿rst stage F statistic in the closed countries sample.
Altogether, the IV results con￿rm the ￿ndings of Tables 4 and 5. In open economies,
corruption is strongly negatively related to output. In closed economies. there is no such
correlation.
8Using the other two instrument sets in the speci￿cation with years of schooling yielded very low ￿rst
stage F statistics, and the results are not reported.
176C o n c l u s i o n s
Although the strong negative correlation between corruption and output suggests that cor-
ruption is harmful for growth there is little direct empirical evidence on why this might be
the case. Our empirical ￿ndings point to one important channel through which corruption
aﬀects economic growth. We interpret our ￿nding that corruption appears to have scarcely
any eﬀect on output in closed economies, and a strong negative eﬀect on output in open
economies, as suggesting that the main damage caused by corruption is due to its eﬀect on
capital ￿ight. Rough estimates of the extent of capital ￿i g h t ,o rm o r ep r e c i s e l y ,t h ea c c u m u -
lated stream of unreported capital out￿ows, reach the magnitude of the entire capital stock
in many African and Latin American countries (see, Pastor, 1990; Boyce and Ndikumana
2001). The argument and evidence presented in this paper suggest that much of this cap-
ital out￿ow may have been illegally obtained. Our argument also explains the correlation
between corruption and investment reported by Mauro (1995).
The argument advanced in this paper also explains why countries such as the United
States, Britain, and France, which were riddled with corruption during large parts of their
history did not seem to suﬀer from corruption economically as much as many of today￿s
African and Latin American countries.
Finally, for simplicity, we have abstracted away from consideration of the advantages
provided by openness. Since the negative eﬀects which are attributed to openness in this
paper are related to corruption, which is more prevalent in poor countries, it may be that
openness may indeed be bene￿cial for richer countries where corruption tends anyway to
be low, but not in poor countries. Wacziarg and Welch￿s (2002) ￿ndings that openness had
bene￿cial eﬀects in the 1980s but not in the 1990s, together with the fact that a large number
of relatively poor countries opened up in the early 90s, supports this hypothesis.
18Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Inspection of the necessary and suﬃcient ￿rst-order condition of
state oﬃcials￿ optimization problem reveals that c(Qt,τt) is implicitly given by the unique
solution, ct, of the following equation,
(1 − π(ct))u
0(γQt + ct)=u(γQt + ct)π
0 (ct), (10)
provided it exists, or by τtQt, whichever is smaller. The properties of u(•)a n dπ (•)i m p l y
that c(Qt,τt) is continuous and nonincreasing in Qt, and nondecreasing in τt. The value Q
is given by the solution to the equation ct (Q,1) = Q. As Qt tends to in￿nity, c(Qt,τt)t e n d s
to zero; and c(Qt,τt)=τtQt for all suﬃciently small values of Qt and τt. By (10), c(Qt,τt)
is independent of τt except in case where τt is so small that state oﬃcials would want to set
ct > τtQt if they could. In this case, because ct is constrained to be smaller than or equal to
τtQt,c(Qt,τt)=τtQt.
Proof of Lemma 2. T h es i z eo ft h et a xr a t eτt has a direct eﬀect on output only through
its eﬀect on yt. As will become clear below when we specify the dynamics of the model, yt
is positively related to Qt+1 a n ds oa l s ot oyt+1. Similarly, yt+1, in turn, is positively related
to Qt+2 and so also to yt+2, and so on. Therefore, choosing the tax rate τt to maximize yt
would also maximize the discounted present value of output, regardless of which discount
rate is chosen.
The government￿s objective in every period t may thus be limited to choosing the tax
rate τt ≤ 1 that maximizes the level of output yt in period t, which, by (??)-(??)i sg i v e nb y
yt =( τtQt − c(Qt,τt))
β ((1 − τt)Qt + φc(Qt,τt))
α . (11)
Obviously, if it is at all possible, or whenever Qt is suﬃciently large, the government would
set τt > ct
Qt. In this case,
∂c(Qt,τt)
∂τt =0 , and so diﬀerentiation of (11) with respect to τt and
equating the derivative with zero yields (7). The second order condition for optimization is
satis￿ed in this solution. When Qt is not suﬃciently large, c(Qt,τt)=τtQt for every τt ≤ 1
and so every τt ∈ [0,1] is optimal.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . (1) Continuity is a consequence of the continuity of c(Qt,τt)a n d
τ (Qt,c t).
19(2) By Lemma 1, for Q ≤ Q,c(Q,τ)=τQ for every tax rate τ ≤ 1, from which it follows
that fφ(Q)=0 . To see that fφ is increasing for Q>Q ,n o t et h a ti fc declines from c1 to c2,
then the government can increase output from Y1 to Y2 by choosing τ2 = τ1 + c1−c2
Q ,
Y2 =( τ2Qt − c2)
β ((1 − τ2)Qt + φc2)
α
=( τ1Qt − c1)
β ((1 − τ1)Qt + φc1 +( 1− φ)(c1 − c2))
α
>Y 1.
For Q>Q ,b yL e m m a1 ,c declines with Q and is unaﬀected by τ. Hence, an increase by Q
reduces c in which case there exist τ for which output increases.
(3) Follows from the fact that c(Q,τ) is nonincreasing in Q and independent of the value
of τ when Q is large, and the fact that τ (Qt,c(Qt)) is decreasing in Qt. Finally,
(4) f0 (Qt) is bounded from above by sQ
β
t (Qt + φct)α which has a derivative that tends
to zero as Qt tends to in￿nity.
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An aggregate of several indicators, collected by international 
organizations, political and business risk rating agencies, think 
tanks and non-governmental organizations, measuring “the 
exercise of public power for private gain.” The index is 
standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
 






An index for “the degree to which business transactions 
involve corruption or questionable payments,” collected by 
Business International, a private firm, during the period 1980-
1983. The raw index is standardized to have mean 0 and 
standard deviation 1. 
 
Mauro (1995)  68 countries 
Wacziarg-Welch Openness 
Dummy, 1990-1999 
A country is defined as open if all the following criteria are 
met: 1) the average of unweighted tariffs in the 1990-1999 
period is lower than 40%; 2) the average of core non-tariff 
barriers on capital goods and intermediates is lower than 40%; 
3) the average black market premium over the period is lower 
than 20%; 4) the country does not have an export marketing 
board; 5) the country is not socialist. 
 












A country is defined as open in any given year if it meets all the 
following criteria: 1) the average of unweighted tariffs is lower 
than 40%; 2) the average of core non-tariff barriers on capital 
goods and intermediates is lower than 40%; 3) the black market 
premium is lower than 20%; 4) it does not have an export 
marketing board; 5) it is not socialist. 
 
Sachs and Warner (1995)  110 countries 
Years of Schooling 
 
Log(1+total years of schooling of population aged 25 and over). 
 
Barro and Lee (2000)  107 countries 
Legal Origins 
 
Dummies for whether the origin of the country’s legal system is 
British (common law), French (civil law), German/Scandinavian 
(civil law) or socialist. 
 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 





Percentage of the population who speaks English as their 
“mother tongue”. 
Alesina et al. (2002)  217 countries 
Percentage European 
Language Speakers 
Percentage of the population who speaks a major European 
language (English, French, German, Spanish, Portuguese) as 
their “mother tongue”. 
 
Alesina et al. (2002)  217 countries 
Ethnic  
Fractionalization 
A variable measuring the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals in the population belong to different ethnic groups. 
Calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index of ethnic group 
shares. 
Alesina et al. (2002)  190 countries 
Linguistic 
Fractionalization 
A variable measuring the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals in the population speak the same “mother tongue”. 
Calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index of language 
shares. 
Alesina et al. (2002)  202 countries  
Table 2: List of Countries by Openness Status and Degree of Corruption 
 















Total: 1 country 
Bangladesh, China, Croatia, Ethiopia, 
Guyana, India, Malawi, Romania, Senegal, 





Total: 12 countries 
Algeria, Angola, Belarus, Chad, Congo, 
Congo Democratic Republic (Zaire), Gabon, 
Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Liberia, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Russia, Serbia/Montenegro, Somalia, Syria, 
Tanzania, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Zambia. 
 
Total: 24 countries 
 
Open 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, 
Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Trinidad and 
Tobago, United Kingdom, United States. 
 
 
Total: 35 countries 
 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, 
Colombia, Cote d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, 
Egypt, El Salvador, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea-Bissau, Jamaica, Jordan, South 
Korea, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, 
Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Moldova, Morocco, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Slovak Republic, South 
Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay. 
 
Total: 38 countries 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Benin, 
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, 
FYR Macedonia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, 






Total: 23 countries 
Notes: Countries are defined to have low, medium, or high corruption based on the Kaufmann et al. (1999) graft index. Countries with an index smaller than –0.5 are defined 
as low corruption, countries with an index between –0.5 and 0.5 are defined as medium corruption, and countries with an index above 0.5 are defined as high corruption. The 
openness dummy is taken from Wacziarg and Welch (2003). Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
  N Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Minimum Maximum 
Log GDP per capita, 
1995-1999  133  8.393 1.147 6.183  10.515 
Corruption,  
1998  133  -0.003 0.949 -2.129 1.567 
Corruption,  




133 0.722  0.450  0  1 
Sachs-Warner Openness 
Dummy, 1992  132 0.591  0.494  0  1 
Sachs-Warner Openness 
Dummy, 1984  101 0.317  0.468  0  1 
Log years of schooling, 
1990  95  1.767 0.485 0.436 2.565 
Legal Origin –  
English  133 0.271  0.446  0  1 
Legal Origin –  
French  133 0.444  0.499  0  1 
Legal Origin –  
Socialist  133 0.203  0.404  0  1 
Legal Origin –  
German  133 0.045  0.208  0  1 
Legal Origin – 
Scandinavian  133 0.038  0.191  0  1 
Percentage English 
Speakers  133  0.064  0.226 0 0.984 
Percentage European 
Language Speakers  133 0.250  0.402  0  1 
Ethnic  
Fractionalization  132  0.444 0.262 0.002 0.930 
Linguistic 
Fractionalization  131  0.393 0.296 0.002 0.923 
Note: The full sample of 133 countries includes all countries with non-missing data on GDP per capita, 
corruption and openness in the 1990s based on the Wacziarg-Welch indicator. 
Table 4: Corruption, Openness, and Economic Development: 
Basic OLS Results 
 











































(4.79)  - - 
 
Log Years of Schooling 
 









No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
F test for  







(0.00)  - - 
N 133  133  95  74  21 
R
2  0.6506 0.7989 0.8768 0.8789 0.5124 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of average GDP per capita between 1995 and 1999. Robust t-
statistics in parentheses. 
* : The sample in column (3) is restricted to countries with non-missing education data.  
Table 5: Robustness Checks 
 



















































































Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No 
 
F test for  














N  94 95 54 66 26 19 
R
2  0.8715  0.870  0.7752 0.7284 0.6311 0.8820 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of average GDP per capita between 1995 and 1999. Robust t-
statistics in parentheses. 
*: In all columns, the sample is restricted to countries with non-missing education data. 
  
Table 6: Instrumental Variables Estimates 
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133 133 130  95  74  21 






















































First Stage F- test: 























(0.101)  0.000 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of average GDP per capita between 1995 and 1999. Robust t-
statistics in parentheses. 
* : The sample in columns (4), (5), and (6)  is restricted to countries with non-missing education data. PREVIOUS DISCUSSION PAPERS 
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